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The inaugural issue of Legislative Studies Quarterly contained one of Tony King’s most 
insightful pieces on parliament and politicians. Published in 1976, ‘Modes of Executive-
Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany’ is in many ways a classic 
Tony King paper: it is elegantly written and wears its learning lightly, yet deploys an 
impressive precision of thought and analysis. It was a path breaking text in legislative 
studies, is still regularly cited, and has influenced the analysis of a generation of 
parliamentary scholars. 
 
King’s central argument was simple: people often spoke of the relationship between 
parliament and government, but ‘in fact it is usually highly misleading to speak of 
“executive-legislative relations” tout court’; rather, ‘if we wish to understand the 
phenomena subsumed under this general heading, we need to identify and consider 
separately a number of quite distinct political relationships’.1 Parliaments, King pointed out, 
are not monoliths; they are complex political organisations made up of numerous members 
organised into different party groups. He demonstrated how talk of ‘executive-legislative 
relations’ masked not only the most important relationships between such groups within 
any one legislature, but also key elements of the diversity of legislatures around the world.  
 
King’s objective was to strip away the noise and present parliamentary dynamics as a set of 
stylised relationships between different actors – an approach which has since become 
increasingly fashionable in legislative studies.2 He did this using three country cases, 
although by far the greatest amount of attention in the article was dedicated to Britain – as 
both the classic majoritarian Westminster system and the one that that King knew best. The 
comparison with France and Germany mostly served to emphasise the particularities of the 
British system. In this article we focus exclusively on Britain, revisiting King’s analysis more 
than 40 years on. In those four decades a huge amount has changed, both in the study of 
politics and in the British parliament itself. We explore both King’s legacy and how his 
analysis of parliamentary ‘modes’ might differ today.  
 
King’s view on executive-legislative relations in the UK 
 
King’s analysis of relations in the House of Commons began with a simple diagram, 
reproduced in Figure 1. This identified four distinct groups: the government (G), government 
backbenchers (GBB), the opposition frontbench (OFB) and opposition backbench (OBB). The 
government’s relationship with parliament needed to be understood in terms of the 
interplay between these different groups. This generated seven different possible sets of 
actors that could potentially work to put pressure on government – that is, each of the three 
other individual groups acting alone, each of three potential pairs, or the combination of all 
three groups acting together. King dismissed some of these possibilities almost immediately: 
OFB was unlikely to act alone, if lacking support from OBB; likewise OFB + GBB was 
implausible – opposition frontbenchers would be in a perilous position if teaming up with 
government backbenchers without their own backbenchers’ support; whilst OBB, unless 
supported by other groups, offered no real threat to government.  
 
He was also sceptical of the combination of all three groups together (GBB + OFB + OBB) 
arguing that this was better considered as a combination of pressure from two distinct 
groups – GBB on the one hand and OFB + OBB on the other. The last of these judgements is 
more questionable than the rest, as we discuss below. 
 





There were therefore three significant modes remaining that could operate within the 
House of Commons. The most obvious and visible was the opposition mode (OFB + OBB → 
G). This was the classic form of Westminster parliamentary conflict, operating between the 
parties. As long as the government had a partisan Commons majority, however, ministers 
had little to fear from this mode. Most of the time the only real tools available to the 
opposition were, in King’s words, ‘good reasons, and time’ (p. 18). The opposition could 
generate a good deal of noise, and potentially delay matters, but without adequate support 
in the division lobbies it was unlikely ultimately to make much if any impact on parliament’s 
decisions. 
 
The second possible configuration was the non-party mode (GBB + OBB → G). This described 
occasions when parliamentarians worked across party lines, for example in select 
committees. King was intrigued by this mode, but dismissive of its applicability in the UK. As 
he suggested, ironically, ‘[t]he non-party mode – which is probably what most people have 
in mind when they speak of “the impact of Parliament on the executive” – is thus also the 
least important mode. The more that Parliament behaves like “Parliament” the less 
influence it has‘. Indeed, ‘[t]o be non-party most of the time in British politics is to be non-
influential’ (p. 20). 
 
This left the intra-party mode: the relationship between the government and its own 
backbenchers (GBB → G). King’s central insight was that this, often less visible, relationship 
was in fact Westminster’s most important. The government could, in normal circumstances, 
fight off attacks from opposition parties. What it found harder to resist were attacks from 
within its own ranks. As King wrote: while ‘one discounts the disapproval of the other party, 
the disapproval of one’s own is harder to bear’ (p. 16), and he noted ‘the needs that 
Government and Government backbenchers have of each other and… the bargaining 
resources that they possess vis-a-vis each other’ (p. 15). The primary asset enjoyed by 
government backbenchers, on which ministers depended, was their votes. Without these 
the government could face defeat against a hostile opposition. Hence ‘[a]s far as the 
Government is concerned, Government backbenchers are the most important Members in 
the House’ (p. 16).  
 
King’s argument was not just that these different modes of working existed, but that 
political scientists were not focussing their efforts in the right place. The balance of the 
literature in 1976 suggested ‘that political scientists have been most interested in the least 
important modes of executive-legislative relations in Britain and least interested in the most 
important’ (p.20). 
 
The other two country cases helped illustrate what was particular about the British system. 
France was judged to be similar, including in terms of the weakness of the non-party mode; 
King noted that there were very few parliamentary procedures or mechanisms through 
which this could be facilitated. In contrast to Britain, the opposition mode also lacked 
facilitating procedures (such as the House of Commons ‘opposition days’). Once again the 
intra-party mode was judged the most important, but with key differences to the UK. 
Among these was French governments’ frequent dependence on a loose parliamentary 
coalition, resulting in ‘an inter-party mode intruding into the intra-party mode’ (p. 22, 
emphasis in original).  
 
The more significant contrast came from Germany. Here there were two key differences to 
Britain: the norm of coalition government, and the strength of the parliamentary committee 
system. The first resulted in more building blocks – rather than the four distinct actors in 
Britain, King detected six in Germany, because both the government frontbench and 
backbench blocks comprised two parts. Consequently, rather than seven potential 
combinations, King suggested that there were 75. Although some of these could be fairly 
readily dismissed, relations in the German system were clearly far more complex. He 
grouped these into four broad modes: (variants of) opposition mode and intra-party mode, 
plus an inter-party mode and a cross-party mode.3 Additionally, the German committee 
system facilitated bargaining, including allowing opposition party members to engage in 
serious policy discussion. King concluded that cross-party alliances were more easily formed 
in Germany, because the parties were less ideologically distant than in Britain, making cross-
voting in committee fairly common. He noted approvingly that sometimes ‘a committee’s 
esprit de corps is so great that it can unite to condemn the Government’ (p. 32). Overall this 
led him to conclude that German arrangements allowed ‘one to speak of “executive-
legislative relations” without the qualification insisted upon in this paper’ (p. 32).  
 
Change in the House of Commons 
 
The fundamentals of King’s analysis have stood the test of time very well. His two core 
insights – that parliaments must be understood as complex organisations comprising 
different groups, and that relations inside the governing party are crucial – remain valid and 
important. But since his text was published, a great deal has also changed. Those familiar 
with British developments will already detect some of what needs revisiting in the above 
account. In this section we focus on four key areas where developments in the House of 
Commons since 1976 require the conclusions of the original analysis to be reassessed. 
 
The party system 
To modern-day observers King’s simple diagrammatic representation of the House of 
Commons will appear stark; government and opposition face each other, with no others 
present. King admitted this was a pared-back version, even in 1976, but indicated that ‘[f]or 
simplicity’s sake we ignore the minor parties’ (p. 13). At the time, and in the interests of 
constructing a parsimonious and elegant model, this can be seen as defensible. But King was 
writing just as the party system was undergoing significant change. Following the 1970 
general election the Liberals had held just six seats in the House of Commons and others 
beyond the big two parties seven; by October 1974 minor parties held 39 seats in total, with 
the notable rise of Plaid Cymru and the SNP. This might at the time have felt like a 
temporary blip, but instead the position held. By 1997 the total beyond the big two had 
reached 76, and by 2015 it had climbed to 88. In 2017, despite a slight fightback from the 
larger parties, the figure still stands at 69. Today, to ‘ignore the minor parties’ is not an 
option.  
 
The effect of this change on ‘modes’ of legislative relations will vary according to the 
particular party configuration, and capturing it diagrammatically is complex; King did not 
attempt such illustration in his analysis of France or Germany, perhaps for this very reason. 
But some modern-day equivalent to his representation of the House of Commons seems 
useful, and we attempt this in Figure 2, which (like King's original) must be read as simplified 
and schematic.4 In the run-up to 2010 the presence of the third party clearly deserves 
acknowledgement; it is shown as 3P in part [a] of the diagram, and includes a frontbench 
(3PFB) and backbench (3PBB) though at this point the distinction is of little import. The 
impact of the third party on day-to-day Commons dynamics at this time – and between 
2015 and 2017 – was fairly limited, thanks to single-party government majorities. The 
number of occasions during this period in which it affected the outcome in the House of 
Commons was tiny.5  
 
But the change has been greater when a single-party majority is lacking. During 2010-15 the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition clearly introduced elements familiar from King’s 
analysis of Germany. As shown in part [b], 3P moved from the opposition to the government 
side of the chamber, and at this point differences between its front and backbench began to 
matter far more. The opposition (as ever) did of course include fourth and minor parties, 
which also came more to the fore, and are marked as 4P. Post-2017 it was the tiny Northern 
Irish DUP upon which the government became dependent, moving 4P to the government 
side of the House in part [c]. Despite the growing complexity, these presentations are still 
simplified – all parties potentially comprise a frontbench and backbench; additional 
opposition parties are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Figure 2: Actors in the contemporary House of Commons 
 
 
The number of new House of Commons modes potentially generated by these 
arrangements is large, even when simplified in this way. When the full range of actors is 
taken into account the 75 potential combinations proposed for Germany could look rather 
modest.6 Suffice, for now, to note that managing the House of Commons has become 
significantly more complex than it used to be.  
 
These changes already seem fundamental, although in practice primarily affect 
parliamentary dynamics when governments lack a single-party majority. Even under 
coalition between 2010-15 (as in [b]), the government mostly still behaved as a bloc, 
although there were occasions when its two component parts went in different directions. 
Under [c], with the DUP only pledging support on parts of the government’s programme, we 
should expect such occasions to be more frequent and for the division between GBB and 4P 
to matter more often.  
 
In addition to these factors other important changes in the Commons apply, irrespective of 
party control, to each of King’s original modes. 
 
The intra-party mode  
Key changes have occurred within the relationship that King considered most important – 
the intra-party mode operating between government and its own backbenchers. This 
mode’s centrality has become increasingly clear, aided to an extent by King’s analysis, but 
also by real-world changes in backbench behaviour and through greater reporting and 
analysis of this behaviour. King’s 1976 complaint that there existed ‘no sustained study of 
the relations between Governments and their own backbenchers’ (p. 20) could not be made 
today. Beginning with Philip Norton’s work, the first volume of which was published in 1975, 
and continuing ever since, we now have multiple studies of the intra-party mode in Britain.7  
 
These studies have shown that backbench dissent was more common than many observers 
had appreciated and also that it has been increasing, both in frequency and importance. 
Between 1945 and 1970 there was not a single government defeat in the House of 
Commons caused by government backbenchers voting against their own party; the handful 
of defeats that did occur were as a result of opposition tactics or mismanagement by the 
government whips. But beginning with the parliament of 1970, and continuing since, every 
Prime Minister has suffered at least one Commons defeat as a result of their own MPs 
defying their whip, and by the 2005-10 parliament, dissenting government backbench votes 
were being cast in 28% of divisions – a then post-war record high. These important changes 
began roughly at the time that King was writing. 
 
Many rebellions are relatively small, and often occur on trivial or minor issues, but they can 
on occasions be large and involve important policy matters. During the 2010-15 parliament, 
backbench dissent was a significant factor in determining government policy towards the 
EU, including being one of the drivers of the subsequent referendum. It also derailed plans 
for Lords reform, which were key to the government’s coalition agreement, and prevented 
the UK from taking military action in Syria.8 Moreover, every study of backbench behaviour 
has also stressed how the threat of Commons defeat, and government moves to placate 
backbench critics, drive more major policy shifts than are visible through defeats.  
 
The causes of this change in behaviour are much discussed (often without very much 
evidence) but the effect is clear: political parties in the House of Commons have become 
significantly more challenging for leaders to manage and hold together – suggesting a 
substantial strengthening of King’s intra-party mode, even under single-party government. 
As he described with respect to Germany, these relations become potentially even more 
difficult under coalition. As captured above, G and 3P must both remain internally cohesive 
between front and backbench, despite having differing policy priorities. Notably in the 2010-
15 parliament levels of dissent among government MPs reached an all-time high of 35%. 
 
The non-party mode 
King noted the lamentable weakness of the non-party mode in the 1970s House of 
Commons. While perhaps exaggerated this criticism was undeniably valid; yet his analysis 
again appeared at the very time that important change was underway. 
 
The primary reason for King’s assessment on this point, particularly when contrasted with 
Germany, was the weakness of the House of Commons committee system. He presciently 
noted the potential of specialist committees to encourage members to ‘change their 
perception of their own roles’ (p. 19) – ceasing to see themselves narrowly in party terms, 
but instead as parliamentarians. Yet this freedom was largely denied to British MPs, given 
the underdeveloped nature of Commons committees. At the time of his writing, prospects 
for a departmental select committee system were already under discussion, making the 
frustration at this gap understandable from committed reformers such as King.9 Reformist 
voices eventually won out, with a departmental select committee system established in 
1979, and gradually becoming increasingly well-established – the committees gaining 
respect through their evidence-taking and expert reports, usually published on a 
unanimous, cross-party basis. As well as building bridges across party lines, the committees 
enabled MPs to develop expertise in particular policy areas, establish networks among 
external specialist groups, and gain confidence to challenge government decisions. These 
attitudes could be displayed in the committee room, but also frequently carried over into 
the chamber.  
 
Studies of the Commons select committees show that their reports are taken seriously by 
ministers, their recommendations are frequently acted upon, and they enjoy an increasingly 
high media profile.10 Further development came through reforms introduced in 2010, which 
changed the method of selection for committee members and chairs – introducing elections 
for the former in party groups and for the latter by all MPs on a cross-party basis. In line 
with desires of parliamentary reformers, this substantially weakened the whips’ patronage 
power, and gave committee chairs greater status and ability to ‘speak for parliament’. The 
same 2010 reform package also introduced the House of Commons Backbench Business 
Committee, and time on the parliamentary agenda for debates sponsored by backbench 
MPs on a cross-party basis. The committee which proposed this package of reforms very 
explicitly sought to build, 30 years later, on the greater cross-party ethos already 
encouraged by the establishment of the select committees in 1979.11 
 
It can therefore no longer be said that the non-party mode in the House of Commons is 
underdeveloped. Indeed, despite select committees not taking the formal committee stage 
of government bills, this mode may well now be substantially better developed than it is in 
many other parliaments – where the norm of specialist committee involvement in bill work 
often results in these committees being subject to significant party control. 
 
The opposition mode and cross-party mode 
King’s third mode of importance was the opposition mode, which in some respects has 
become less significant. If, in 1976, King was able to note that the only tools the official 
opposition had were ‘good reasons, and time’, then arguably the only one of these that 
remains (except under very specific circumstances) is good reason. The changes to House of 
Commons timetabling made during the Blair years, introducing routine ‘programming’ of 
bills, very substantially weakened the opposition’s power of delay. Even 40 years ago, King 
noted that time was mostly a nuisance weapon, not a lethal one. Today it is often not even 
that.  This development was deprecated by Conservative politicians at the time, but 
noticeably not reversed by them on taking office.  
 
Such changes may partially have served, however, to focus the opposition more on ‘good 
reason’. Another classic tool available to the opposition, not mentioned by King, is the 
power of publicity. Opposition frontbenchers have significant ability to set the media 
agenda using the public platform of parliament. If they can make a coherent case against 
government policy, this can create risks for ministers – particularly if government 
backbenchers find the opposition’s case convincing. The kinds of changes already discussed 
above – including the establishment of select committees, and the (partly consequent) 
greater parliamentary engagement by pressure groups will also encourage a turn to 
‘reason’. These changes place greater evidence in front of parliamentarians which may be 
used to confront government policy. This is particularly useful to the opposition, and its 
ability to build wider alliances. 
 
The opposition mode has therefore not just declined, although it has undoubtedly changed. 
It has become more evidence-based, drawing it closer to the non-party and intra-party 
modes. The potential for a cross-party mode (OFB + OBB + GBB→ G) is hence significantly 
greater than it was in King’s day.  
 
A further important driver of this change has been something that he entirely ignored – the 
role of the House of Lords. 
 
King’s blind spot: the House of Lords  
 
Some of the biggest recent developments in UK executive-legislative relations have 
concerned the House of Lords. Unlike the changes discussed above, these cannot be seen as 
incremental adjustments to King’s classic scheme, as he gave no consideration to the second 
chamber whatsoever. Not only did the Lords go unmentioned, but throughout the article he 
used the terms ‘Parliament’ and ‘House of Commons’ interchangeably.12 As with respect to 
minor parties, this can perhaps be seen as an excusable simplification at that time – given 
that the Lords was then viewed as a fairly sleepy political institution. But he also disregarded 
bicameralism in France and Germany (the only indirect indication that it existed being 
occasional references to French ‘senators’), which is more surprising.13 King’s executive-
legislative relations were staunchly, if silently, unicameral. 
 
This attitude now looks rather quaint. Once again, change to the dynamics of British 
bicameralism could already be seen as underway when King wrote, albeit on a slower track 
to other developments above. The Life Peerages Act of 1958 revived the Lords from a 
previously parlous state, and by the 1970s it was actually quite lively – the highest number 
of government defeats in the chamber of any parliamentary session on record (126) in fact 
occurred in the 1975-76 session. King might correctly have argued that such defeats were of 
little more than nuisance value, as the Conservative and hereditary-dominated chamber 
almost invariably backed down if Labour ministers rejected its proposals.14 The key change, 
to both the Lords’ composition and behaviour, came later, with the Labour government’s 
reform of 1999. This ejected the great majority of hereditary peers, leaving a far more 
balanced chamber in which no party would have a majority. Partly as a consequence, peers 
felt more confident to challenge government policy.15 
 




The internal dynamics of the contemporary House of Lords are indicated in Figure 3. The 
membership of the chamber can be simplified to four main blocks: Conservative, Labour, 
Liberal Democrat and non-party. The first three of these clearly have a frontbench (FB) and 
backbench (BB) element, though we will initially put this to one side. The fourth group also 
includes different components, but there is little value in conceiving of these separately 
since all their members vote as individuals, rather than blocks. The largest element is the 
Crossbenchers, so we term this group XB, though it also includes 26 bishops and a small 
number of other non-affiliated peers.16 Collectively, such members hold around 200 seats, 
which is roughly equivalent to each of the two main parties. The Liberal Democrats, on 
around 100 seats, are a further important block. As above, despite the complexities of 
coalition, we simply label Labour and Conservatives as (in whichever configuration) 
government and opposition. We also ignore the small number of seats held by more minor 
parties. 
 
The modes operating in the Lords, as in the Commons, differ under periods of single-party 
and coalition government. The single-party configuration – shown as [a] – is the simpler of 
the two, but distinctly more challenging for government than that in the other chamber. 
Either Labour governments (as occurred 1999-2010) or Conservative governments (as since 
2015) can find themselves significantly outnumbered by other forces in the chamber. 
Pressures can include various combinations of GBB, O, LD and XB. Those that most obviously 
matter are the ones potentially comprising a majority against the government. Hence 
individual groupings (e.g. O → G, LD → G, XB → G) pose a limited threat. But where groups 
band together, and express shared policy concerns, there are various prospects for 
government defeat. All key groupings with defeat potential are therefore variants of the 
cross-party mode: O + LD → G, O + XB → G and O + LD + XB → G. In practice XB does not 
vote as a block, and some members of this grouping are likely to support the government, 
while abstentions (or absences for other reasons) in all groups are relatively common. This 
makes voting outcomes unpredictable. Fundamentally, however, both LD and XB may prove 
pivotal, enabling O to inflict defeat on government. 
 
Under coalition – shown as [b] – while matters inside government are more complex, the 
Lords becomes more comfortable for ministers. During 2010-15 LD could mostly be 
depended upon to vote on the government side, which left XB as the only pivotal group. The 
combination O + XB → G still held some threat, but was relatively difficult for the opposition 
to sustain due both to shortage of numbers and non-party peers’ hesitancy to use their full 
power against the government.17  
 
While undoubtedly being of increased importance in the British parliamentary system, the 
House of Lords remains in fundamental senses the subordinate chamber. While the 
Commons can in extremis pass legislation without the Lords’ consent (though this happens 
vanishingly rarely), there is no possibility for the Lords to get changes onto the statute book 
without consent from the Commons. As an unelected body, both convention and logic also 
dictate that the Lords should respect the will of the elected House of Commons. Whether 
ministers can withstand Lords defeat ultimately depends on views in the other chamber. A 
Lords majority against the government, therefore, is relatively powerless unless it can find 
support from a majority of MPs. 
 
Lords modes can thus only be assessed for their effectiveness once coupled with modes in 
the Commons – where the intra-party mode is key. A majority government can remain 
robust against attack so long as it retains support from its own backbench MPs, but where 
this is lacking it will often back down to the Lords. The most high-profile recent example 
demonstrating such dynamics occurred in autumn 2015 on the Conservative government’s 
attempt to cut tax credits.18 A Lords defeat initially fiercely resisted by ministers went on to 
be quietly accepted as it was realised that many government backbench MPs agreed with 
the Lords. Given patterns of abstention by peers, and tendencies for GBB in both chambers 
to express concerns to ministers privately, this group’s views will not always be evident in 
the division lobbies. But the most dangerous bicameral modes for the government to face 
are those which are very clearly cross-party: O + LD + GBB → G, O + XB + GBB → G and O + 
LD + XB + GBB → G.19  
 
Modern modes of executive-legislative relations in the UK 
 
In the intervening 40 years, all three of the modes that King detected in the British House of 
Commons have changed substantially. The intra-party and non-party modes have both 
become more visible and stronger. The opposition mode has changed from one which was, 
in King’s view, a mere nuisance to the government – based largely on time wasting – to one 
which is more focused on reason and policy substance. All of these pressures have 
contributed to the development of a more serious cross-party mode. 
 
King noticed the presence of such a mode in Germany, but judged it to be missing from 
Westminster. This is partly a quirk of his original scheme. He noted that opposition votes 
became important ‘only on the fairly rare occasions… when dissident Government 
backbenchers and the Opposition join forces’ – which he referred to as the operation of 
‘two modes at once’ (p. 18). That is, he simply didn’t accept the existence of OFB + OBB + 
GBB → G as a mode, however rare. But since underpinning the intra-party mode is, at least 
in part, the threat that dissident members of GBB could band together with the opposition 
in the division lobbies it seems rather grudging to deny the existence of a cross-party mode. 
It is unlikely that government backbenchers were able to extract all of the concessions that 
he noted, even in the 1960s, without the fear by ministers that the opposition would have 
backed their position. Nonetheless the decline of party cohesion, and increased 
opportunities for cross-party work, have by now greatly enhanced the importance of such a 
mode. 
 
One of the key changes since King’s original analysis is that any serious treatment must be 
based on ‘modes of bicameral executive-legislative relations’, and must also recognise the 
different dynamics of single-party and coalition government. Putting together the analysis 
of the Commons and the Lords, we see that under single-party government (part [a] in 
Figures 2 and 3) the combination OFB + OBB + LD + GBB→ G (with or without XB) is greatly 
problematic for ministers. They must work hard to maintain backbench support in the 
Commons; meanwhile the main opposition has a significant incentive to build alliances with 
LD (and of course GBB), which encourages cross-party relations in both chambers. Under 
coalition (shown instead in part [b] in Figures 2 and 3), the key dynamic is the inter-party 
one that King observed in Germany, between G and 3P (in both frontbench and backbench 
configurations). This means that in the Lords, things are potentially easier – but notably only 
if 3P = LD, as was the case 2010-15. The fallout from that period was the Liberal Democrats’ 
2015 collapse in seats in the House of Commons, leaving the SNP as the most significant 
third party. The 2017 parliament saw arrival of an even more complex arrangement, where 
the government must placate a force to its right in the Commons (the DUP) and to its left in 
the Lords (LD). 
 
The closest comparator for today’s UK politics in King’s original article is his analysis of 
Germany, though if anything British arrangements today seem more complex. In his 
conclusions, King suggested that the extent of inter-party and cross-party contact in the 
German parliament meant that it did in fact make sense to discuss executive-legislative 
relations ‘tout court’. That might, therefore, now be said of Britain – at least on occasions – 
but to do so would lose a great deal of the richness and insight that comes from the kind of 
analysis that he pioneered. 
 
Conclusion  
Tony King’s 1976 analysis of executive-legislative relations was prescient, and retains a core 
of wisdom and judgement that transfers to the present. But he captured the dynamics of 
the ‘old’ Westminster just as the system was on the cusp of change. The widely-noted 
transformation of the party system in the 1970s, and the establishment of the House of 
Commons select committees, which boosted cross-party working, occurred just after he 
wrote. In subsequent years further procedural changes, coupled with the substantial 
membership reform in the House of Lords, changed things further. 
 
King never revisited his analysis. He was too busy with innumerable other projects, some of 
which are discussed elsewhere in this volume. As a scholar who clearly recognised, in his 
treatment of France and Germany, the importance of parliamentary procedure to the 
facilitation of group dynamics, he might have concluded that the new procedures in the 
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Commons were important. In some of his later work he certainly recognised the importance 
of change in the House of Lords.20 But ironically, he more often remained somewhat 
negative about parliament, and had a tendency towards a ‘declinist’ view.21 
 
King’s central vision, and pioneering approach, was to appreciate that parliaments must be 
understood not as monoliths vis-a-vis executives, but as complex organisations comprising 
various interacting groups. This approach is valuable in dissecting and understanding the 
nature of change in UK parliamentary politics. It is a shame that he never revised this 
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